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Abstract: The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive contains a general
clause according to which ‘a contractual term which has not been individually
negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good
faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’ (Article 3(1)). The
open-textured nature of this clause requires further guidance as to what constitu-
tes a significant imbalance contravening the principle of good faith. The question
is whether self- and co-regulation of B2C contracts give rise to such guidance. This
paper ascertains to what extent private or mixed standards are taken into con-
sideration in the assessment of contract terms by civil judges. It depicts how
private regulation flows into the judicial interpretation of the open fairness norm,
especially in France (recommendations of the Commission des clauses abusives)
and in the Netherlands (GTC agreed upon by both trade and consumer organisa-
tions). By taking this regulation into account while assessing the fairness of a
contract term on the basis of a legal norm, civil courts confer legitimacy on it. It
appears that private standards are deemed fair or viewed as a benchmark of
fairness in view of their co-regulatory nature. Co-regulation however does not
always vouch for in concreto and even in abstracto fair standards. It should
therefore not exempt private standards from being put to a broader fairness
review.
Résumé: La Directive sur les clauses abusives contient une clause ouverte selon
laquelle ‘une clause d’un contrat n’ayant pas fait l’objet d’une négociation indivi-
duelle est considérée comme abusive lorsque, en dépit de l’exigence de bonne
foi, elle crée au détriment du consommateur un déséquilibre significatif entre les
droits et obligations des parties découlant du contrat’ (article 3-1). La nature
indéfinie de cette clause requiert des repères supplémentaires pour établir l’exis-
tence d’un déséquilibre significatif enfreignant le principe de bonne foi. La ques-
tion soulevée dans cet article concerne la mise à disposition de tels repères par
des structures d’auto- et/ou de corégulation des contrats. Cette contribution
examine dans quelle mesure des standards établis par des acteurs privés, seuls
ou en coopération avec des acteurs publics, sont pris en considération lors de
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l’appréciation du caractère abusif d’une clause contractuelle. Elle dépeint l’influ-
ence de ces standards privés ou mixtes sur la notion de clause abusive telle
qu’elle est interprétée et appliquée par les juges civils en France ainsi qu’aux
Pays-Bas. En laissant ces standards (les recommandations de la Commission des
clauses abusives en France et les conditions générales bilatérales négociées par
les associations de professionnels et de consommateurs aux Pays Bas) étoffer une
norme légale, les juges leur confèrent une certaine légitimité. Il apparait que
l’influence de ces standards est étroitement liée au fait qu’ils soient le résultat de
corégulation. Qu’un standard soit issu d’une forme de corégulation ne garantit
néanmoins aucunement le caractère non-abusif de la clause contractuelle s’y
conformant. Cette clause ne sera donc pas exempte d’une confrontation plus
large à la norme établie par la directive.
Zusammenfassung: Der vorliegende Beitrag zielt darauf ab zu zeigen, wie wichtig
private Regelsetzung für die richterliche Interpretation und Anwendung von
Verbrauchervertragsrecht in der Europäischen Union ist. Dafür beleuchtet der
Beitrag das Wechselspiel zwischen privater Regelsetzung zum Phänomen Stan-
dardklauseln (AGB) und der Auslegung, die die Generalklausel in der AGB-
Richtlinie erfahren hat, nach der missbräuchliche Standardklauseln nicht bin-
dend sind. Geben private Regelwerke dieser Generalklausel in der EG-Richtlinie
mehr Gehalt und, wenn dies der Fall sein sollte, unter welchen Umständen wirken
sie so und ist diese Wirkung normativ positiv zu bewerten – Letzteres unter dem
doppelten Gesichtspunkt und der doppelten Zielsetzung dieser Richtlinie, dass
sie den Verbraucherschutz fördern, vor allem aber auch harmonisieren soll.
Keywords: general fairness clause, unfair contract terms, general contract terms,
self-regulation, co-regulation, European contract law
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I Introduction
In the field of consumer policy, private regulatory mechanisms are not so much
an alternative as a complement to public rules. Self- or co-regulatory instruments
can play an important role in delivering a high level of consumer protection. Co-
regulation in this paper is used in the double sense of both cooperating with
public actors and involving all stakeholders (such as trade and consumer associa-
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tions).1 This paper examines the role played by private standards with regard to
the fairness of non-individually negotiated contract terms, also known as general
terms and conditions (GTC), in the judicial interpretation and application of the
fairness clause established by the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts
(UTD).2 Section II starts with a short description of the multi-layered legal fairness
clause. The European fairness clause is interpreted and applied by courts and
public authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer law. The open-
textured nature of the clause requires further guidance as to what constitutes an
unfair contract term. Public sources (legal rules and principles, precedents,
guidance from administrative bodies) provide some guidance, but to what extent
do courts fall back on private regulation (model-contracts, two-sided GTC, recom-
mendations, ADR)? Section III depicts the private policing of GTC in France, the
Netherlands and England. These Member States (MS) were chosen for their
divergent self-regulatory approaches to consumer GTC. Section IV subsequently
explores whether and how private regulation is embedded in the judicial inter-
pretation of the fairness norm in those MS. Finally, section V discusses the
grounds on which legitimacy is conferred on private regulation. The significance
of private standards of fairness for the harmonised interpretation and application
of the European fairness norm will be discussed in section VI.
II The multi-layered open fairness norm
1 The European open fairness norm
The UTD contains an open-textured clause according to which ‘ a contractual term
which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary
to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’
rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’
(Article 3(1)). The UTD was conceived and eventually enacted as an open-ended
system of control in which unfairness would depend on the specifics of each
contractual relationship. As Article 4(1) UTD dictates, courts should take into
consideration the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was
1 Cf G. Howells, ‘Co-Regulation’s Role in the Development of European Fair Trading Laws’, in
H. Collins (ed), The Forthcoming EC Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2004) 120–121 and 126.
2 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts,OJ 1993 L95/
29.
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concluded, all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and all
the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.
The good faith requirement permits an overall evaluation of the different interests
involved. The circumstances the Directive and its recital refer to are both substan-
tive (pertaining to the content of the terms) and procedural (relating to the
conclusion of the contract).3 Both a concrete and an abstract review of a contract
term are possible.4 The type of review will often depend on but should not be
equated with the repressive or preventive5 nature of the procedure. An individual
procedure can for example boil down to an abstract review (based on a black list).
Open norms constitute flexible safety nets that are able to ‘catch’ all kinds of
new situations. A major disadvantage of open norms however is their high level
of abstraction. The open fairness norm can generate many disputes about its
interpretation and application to a particular contract term. The existence of a
significant contractual imbalance and the breach of the good faith-requirement
discern a fair contract term from an unfair one. It is however difficult to get grip
on those criteria as they do not give clear information on the distinction between
fair and unfair terms. The annex of the UTD provides some guidance on what
terms may be regarded as unfair, even though this list of presumably unfair terms
is indicative and non-exhaustive. In order to weigh the circumstances and to
determine whether a contract term, contrary to the requirement of good faith,
significantly brings the contract out of balance, courts might have recourse to
complementary fairness indicators.
National courts are obliged to interpret the national fairness clause in con-
formity with the wording and purpose of the UTD in order to achieve the result
referred to in Article 288(3) TFEU.6 The European Court of Justice (CJEU) has not
conceded much information yet on how to interpret the UTD’s open norm. The
CJEU case law provides national courts leeway to decide how to weigh the
established circumstances surrounding a particular case.7 Bypassing those cir-
cumstances is only allowed as far as this does not lower the level of protec-
tion granted to the consumer by the concrete assessment laid down by Article 3(1)
3 According to recital 16 ‘ in making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to
the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to
agree to the term and whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the
consumer; whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the seller or supplier where he
deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate interests he has to take into account’.
4 Case C-70/03, Commission v Spain [2004] ECR I-7999, para 16.
5 Article 7(2) UTD provides for both an administrative control and collective challenge of unfair
terms.
6 Case C-14/83,Von Colson & Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, para 26.
7 Case C-237/02,Hofstetter [2004] ECR I-3403.
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and 4 UTD.8 National courts retain discretion to rely on fairness benchmarks from
national origin (such as lists, default rules9 or precedents) as long as they warrant
the minimum level of protection guaranteed by the Directive. The problem is that
the contours of this minimum level of protection remain vague as they have only
loosely been marked by both the European legislator and the CJEU.10
2 The national open fairness norm in France,
the Netherlands and England
The European fairness norm has been implemented through national legislation.
The Dutch Civil Code already contained an open fairness norm under which the
content of GTC could be reviewed. This norm transposes Article 3(1) UTD by
forbidding ‘unreasonably burdensome’ contract terms (Article 233(a) of Book 6 of
the Civil Code). English law lacked a general clause permitting the substantive
review of (all types of) GTC and therefore a new open norm has been introduced
into English law. Within the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations
(UTCCR), the Regulation transposing Article 3(1) literally copies the European
wordings. The French Code de la consommation already comprised an open norm
prohibiting the use of unfair contract terms.11 While incorporating the European
norm into national law, the French legislator got rid of the good faith criterion,
limiting the definition of an unfair contract term to a term that is causing a
significant imbalance in the contracting parties’ rights and obligations.
The enforcement of the open norm from the UTD is largely a matter of
individual and collective procedures before civil courts. In the three legal systems
under scrutiny in this essay, administrative bodies are also entrusted with the
public enforcement of the open norm and may take a case to court if a rogue
trader persists in infringing on the legal standard, by means of a so-called
8 The CJEU itself applied an abstract review of a jurisdiction clause and declared it unfair as it
was solely to the benefit of the trader and contained no benefit in return for the consumer: joined
cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo [2000] ECR I-4941. Circumstances surrounding the
conclusion of the contract were deemed irrelevant: see Hofstetter, n 7 above, para 23.
9 Case C-415/11, Aziz v Catalunyacaixa, n y r, para 68; case C‑226/12, Constructora Principado v
Menéndez Álvarez, n y r, para 21.
10 C.M.D.S. Pavillon, Open normen in het Europees consumentenrecht: de oneerlijkheidsnorm in
vergelijkend perspectief (Deventer: Kluwer, 2011) passim.
11 This norm was originally meant to be concretised through administrative decrees. After a
successful ‘ coup d’État jurisprudentiel’, civil courts nevertheless started reviewing GTC under this
norm: cf F. Terré, P. Simler and Y. Lequette,Droit civil – Les obligations (Paris: Dalloz, 2005) 328.
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injunctive relief.12 This already occurred in England where the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT), along with the local Trading Standards, plays a prominent role in
the enforcement of the UTD (from April 2014, many of the functions of the OFT
and Competition Commission will be combined into the new Competition and
Markets Authority).13 In the Netherlands, the Authority for Consumers and Mar-
kets (the ACM) will soon be entrusted with the autonomous competence to
enforce the fairness norm and to impose sanctions on deviant traders.14
3 National fairness benchmarks used by civil courts
To fill in the legal standard of fairness and more specifically the criteria defining
an unfair term (being unreasonably burdensome in the Netherlands, causing a
significant contractual imbalance in France and a significant contractual imbal-
ance in breach of the requirement of good faith in UK) national courts may need
additional standards of fairness. Some courts draw up the balance sheet without
relying on extra benchmarks. The French circumstantial test is regularly confined
to the search for a compensatory term elsewhere in the contract and the Dutch
test frequently restricts itself to the balancing of the interests of the parties to the
contract.15 Courts however often resort to complementary gauges of fairness to
flesh out the legal criteria in the light of which the fairness of a contract term is
being assessed. The indicative list of presumably unfair terms in the annex to the
UTD is such a gauge. Fairness benchmarks are nonetheless far more numerous at
the national level than at the European level. This essay will distinguish between
public and private benchmarks of fairness from national origin. National public
benchmarks consist of legal principles, default rules, lists or precedents.16 The
availability, the use and the conclusiveness of those yardsticks vary greatly across
MS.
12 The Dutch Consumer Authority was only recently initiated by Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004
on consumer protection cooperation.
13 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2001] 1 UKHL 52. However, UK’s system
of local authority enforcement contrasts with the enforcement framework found in other MS
where the duty to enforce primarily falls to national authorities.
14 Kamerstukken II (Parliamentary Documents of the Lower House) 2012–2013, 33622, no 2.
15 Pavillon, n 10 above, para 359.
16 M. Tenreiro, ‘The Community Directive on Unfair Terms and National Legal Systems’ (1995) 3
European Review of Private Law 290.
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Reasonable expectations doctrine
Dutch and English courts frequently translate the fairness test into an assessment
of the reasonable expectations of the consumer, a legal principle holding that, in
general, the provisions of a contract are to be interpreted according to how a
‘reasonable person’ or a ‘typical consumer’ (who is not trained in the law) would
interpret them.17 A contract term is unfair as it frustrates those objectively defined
expectations. These expectations are largely determined by the procedural cir-
cumstances of the case in combination with substantive benchmarks such as
default rules (normative expectations – mostly in the UK) and business usage
(descriptive expectations –mostly in the Netherlands, see IV.2).
Default rules
To assess the existence of a ‘significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obli-
gations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’ a judge can
refer to non-mandatory rules. As the Commission notes, ‘in order to determine
whether a term can be declared unfair, (it is …) not enough just to apply the general
assessment criterion; one also has to determine what legal rule would apply in the
absence of such a term.’18 Non-mandatory rules are held to reflect the ideal
balance of interests between the parties to the contract. Within French case law,
the deviation from supplementary substantive rules of contract regularly deter-
mines the unfairness of the term.19 Likewise, the equivalence with mandatory or
default rules often implies the term is fair.20 According to Dutch law, the compar-
ison with non-mandatory law is not conclusive and Dutch courts rarely refer to
default rules.21 In England, ‘default rules (including implied terms) and remedies’
are an acknowledged benchmark of fairness but as ‘contract law is not codified or
17 C. Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts. The Case of Unfair Terms (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2007) 142 et seq, 181–182. Cf Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [1999] EWHC
Ch 206, para 39;Office of Fair Trading v Foxtons Ltd [2009] EWHC 1681 (Ch), para 91.
18 Report from the Commission on the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April
1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (COM(2000) 248 final). See also case C-415/11, Aziz v
Catalunyacaixa, n y r, para 68 and case C-226/12, Constructora Principado vMenéndez Álvarez, n y
r, para 21.
19 See eg CFI Grenoble 17 November 2003 & CA Versailles 4 February 2004, available at <www.
clauses-abusives.fr/juris/index.htm> accessed 7 January 2014.
20 Cass Civ 1re 1 February 2005, no 05-19692, Bull civ 2005 I, no 64, 56.
21 Amendment Korthals (no 30) and VC II 28 January 1985, Parliamentary History Book 6 of the
Civil Code (Inv 3, 5 and 6), 1598.
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anyway not regulated in detail’ there is a need for other indicators.22 What is more,
the English judiciary has on occasion doubted whether the law of implied terms
reflects the ideal balance of interests between traders and consumers.23
Lists
As the UTD strives for minimum harmonisation, MS are allowed to enact stricter
national standards, by invalidating contract terms or by shifting the burden of
proof on to the professional party by means of national regulation. The Nether-
lands had already promulgated lists of ‘black’ and ‘grey’ terms prior to the
UTD. Those lists were kept and even lengthened, thereby raising the fairness
standard at the national level. French law prohibited a few terms at the time the
Directive was implemented but the French legislator adopted both a ‘black’ and a
‘grey’ list in 2009. The fairness standard laid down in such lists is more concrete
than the one provided by the open norm, giving courts and professionals firm
guidelines to hold on to. In comparison, the English UTCCR provides in Schedule
2 the same list as appears in the UTD, stating in regulation 5(5) that such ‘terms
may be regarded as unfair’.
In the case of a conflict between a consumer and a business, Dutch and
French courts first compare the contract term under review with the compulsory
lists. Verification against the open norm only occurs if a term does not appear on
the lists. A mere illustrative list serves as a benchmark when fleshing out the open
norm. The English list of terms that may be regarded as unfair has the same
indicative character as the annex of the UTD. This list, in particular point (q), is
sometimes referred to as an argument underpinning the unfairness of a term.24
Compulsory lists of suspicious terms may still serve as a yardstick when applying
the open norm because of the close resemblance between the term under review
and a term on the list (reasoning by analogy).
22 P. Nebbia, Unfair Contract Terms in European Law. A Study in Comparative and EC Law
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 155; Willett, n 17 above, 47–48 and 254. Pavillon, n 10 above, para
122–123 and 308–310.
23 DGFT v First National Bank [2001] 1 UKHL 52, para 38.
24 Zealander v Laing Homes [1999] CILL 1510; Standard Bank London v Apostolakis [2001] EWHC
493 (Commercial Court); Picardi v Cuniberti [2002] EWHC 2923 (TCC).
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Precedents
This benchmark plays a significant role in the English common law legal system25
but even in the Netherlands and France, court decisions involving the open norm
sometimes furnish the basis for subsequent cases involving similar facts and
issues.26
Administrative guidance: soft public law
Decisions and guidance from (national or local) administrative bodies responsible
for the enforcement of the fairness norm can also be viewed as public benchmarks
of fairness. In the three MS under investigation this type of benchmark is only
widely available in England.27 However, English courts generally don’t take the
OFT-guidance into consideration when assessing the fairness of a contract term.28
This is understandable in the light of the system of checks and balances.29 Ex ante
OFT-guidance is moreover fairly abstract in nature whereas the judicial assess-
ment in the UK is very broad and factual.
Private benchmarks?
Next to public benchmarks, private benchmarks may also give courts something
to hold on to. Private standards may help to inform the content of the fairness
norm. The next paragraph explores what private regulation of GTC at the national
level entails. Since private regulation aims at a minimum correction of market
failures, the drafting of GTC by an individual trader is not in itself a form of private
regulation and will not be dealt with in this paper. And since the fairness norm
applies to business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts I will only focus on GTC that
apply to B2C transactions, thereby making a distinction between the drafting and
the reviewing of GTC by private actors (ADR).
25 Domsalla v Dyason [2007] EWHC 1174 (TCC), para 92; Allen Wilson Shopfitters v Buckingham
[2005] EWHC 1165 (TCC), para 41–45.
26 CFI Leeuwarden 7 May 2004, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2004:AO9738.
27 Due to the lack of compulsory lists, the OFT relies on the open norm and the indicative list.
28 One exception is Peabody Trust v Reeve [2008] EWHC 1432 (Ch), para 54–55.
29 The pro-consumer guidance issued by the OFT does not address national courts.
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III The private standards at hand
1 The drafting of GTC: the legal framework
Considerations of economic efficiency urge professionals to make use of model
contracts. The drafting of standard contract terms is in itself the most important
and purest form of self-regulation in the field of contract law.30 Professionals are,
to a certain extent,31 free to define the small print on which the contract will be
concluded with a consumer and to specify or even deviate from the legal stan-
dards.32
How much space is left to traders to define GTC mainly depends on how
tightly sectors are regulated at the national level and the quantity of mandatory
clauses professionals have to reproduce. In France, there are huge exceptions to
the freedom to decide on the content of a contract as evidenced by the regulatory
technique of inserting terms into certain types of contract directly by law or by
public bodies under legal powers.33 The numerous decrees and compulsory model
contracts existing in France considerably reduce the scope for private regula-
tion.34
The Dutch legislator actively stimulates self-regulation of B2C contracts.35 The
Dutch Civil Code countenances bilateral GTC by giving the professional an oppor-
tunity to modify his terms in a mutual dialogue before allowing a consumer
30 T. Van Mierlo, ‘Self-regulation in the consumer field: the Dutch approach’, in J. Rutgers (ed),
European Contract Law and the Welfare State (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2011) 2;
J.B.M. Vranken, Mr. C. Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht.
Algemeen Deel [3]. Een vervolg (Deventer: Kluwer, 2005) 88–89.
31 M. Hesselink, ‘Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract Law’ (2005) 1 European Review of
Contract Law 67–68.
32 Traders may deviate from non-mandatory rules and specify open-formulated mandatory rules
and general clauses.
33 S. Whittaker, ‘Contractual Control and Contractual Review in England and France’ (2005) 6
European Review of Private Law 758. Credit contracts for example have to reproduce one of the
nine model contracts drawn up by the national legislature. Besides such model contracts French
law also provides for (modèles de) cahiers des charges: terms on which certain contracts involving
a (former) public service are concluded and that are set by administrative decree.
34 In the 80s, a proposal to bestow an important role on collective agreements (accords collectifs)
that would regulate GTC failed to be translated into French consumer law: see G. Raymond, Droit
de la consommation (Paris: Lexis Nexis, 2008) 373.
35 T. Van Mierlo, ‘Consumer Protection on the Single Market: Self-Regulation for Dating Ser-
vices’, in K. Boele-Woelki and F. Grosheide (eds), The Future of European Contract Law (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2007) 413–414. The Dutch Civil Code fosters the dialogue
between consumer and professional organisations.
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organisation to start an action (Article 240(4) of Book 6). Self-regulation is con-
sidered to have many advantages in comparison to public regulation as it directly
answers the specific needs of a sector, increases commitment and rapidly ad-
dresses changing circumstances.36 English law also fosters self-regulatory prac-
tice, entrusting the OFT with the task to publicly endorse codes of conduct.37
Those codes guide contractual practices that will materialise in GTC (eg warran-
ties, complaint and settlement of dispute).
From the perspective of consumer protection, it is crucial that consumer
GTC are made consistent with the legal standard or even improve upon the level
of protection warranted by law. The UTD does however not explicitly incite
professionals to join efforts to draft GTC that meet the fairness standard. Article
7(2) only requires MS to ensure that the use of unfair terms is effectively
prevented. The significance of ‘consumer-friendly’ self-regulation differs greatly
across MS, as does the interference by public authorities and the direct involve-
ment of consumer organisations into the self-regulatory process. We therefore
encounter different kinds of GTC applicable to B2C contracts at the national
level: unilateral GTC on the one hand, which are drafted with or without sectoral
cooperation and with or without the assistance and approval of public autho-
rities and bilateral conditions on the other hand, which are directly agreed upon
by consumer organisations. Unilateral GTC may or may not be specially tailored
to B2C transactions.
2 The drafting of unilateral GTC applicable to B2C transactions:
the level of sectoral cooperation
Sectoral organisations are best placed to draft GTC as they have the best overview
and knowledge of the peculiarities of the business sector.38 In the MS under
scrutiny there is difference in the degree to which professionals spontaneously
organise themselves in trade bodies and subsequently draft standardised GTC
within a branch of business.39 Trade associations do not have the same size and
degree of cohesion.
36 See VanMierlo, n 30 and 35 above.
37 Enterprise Act 2002, s 8(2).
38 See Vranken, n 30 above.
39 The existence of a trade association does not guarantee that model contracts will be drafted.
There are many European sectoral associations but few have yet managed to draft pan-European
sets of GTC to be applied in the same sector throughout the EU.
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Traders are well-organised in the Netherlands and trade bodies generally
develop GTC for their members.40 Many professionals dealing with consumers41
have joined the easily identifiable national trade bodies that have reached an
agreement with consumer associations on bilateral GTC (see III.4).42 The Nether-
lands are well known for their strong tradition of social dialogue (the acclaimed
polder model).
Traders in the UK also largely organise themselves in local and national trade
bodies. English trade and professional associations sometimes devise GTC for
their members. An example of GTC that also apply to B2C contracts are the con-
ditions of engagement included in the standard form of appointment (SFA)
developed by the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA). Most associations
only issue guidelines or codes of practice though. Subscribers to those codes
however have to incorporate contractual practices stemming from those guide-
lines and codes into their consumer GTC.
In France, organisations of traders dealing with consumers are less active
than their Dutch and English counterparts. Existing trade associations, like for
example the FNAEM (home furnishing), do not provide for GTC and rarely issue
codes of conduct or other forms of guidance. There are however a few exceptions:
a code of conduct that will influence the formulation of GTC applicable to the
online sale of electrical and electronic devices was recently devised by the FEVAD
(e-commerce and distant selling) and several other trade organisations.43
Professionals dealing with consumers who draft GTC without assistance of a
trade association – either because they decline this support or because such
assistance is not available – still have different ‘tools’ at their disposal. These
model contracts are designed by independent private intermediaries such as legal
scholars or lawyers. Publishers may provide for standard contracts.44
40 Those traders who are not affiliated to a trade association may nevertheless apply GTC that
were drafted by such an organisation.
41 Professionals who deal with ‘consumers’ within the sense of the UTD are, among others,
furniture retailers, travel agents, direct sellers, architects, public transporters, car renters, dealers
and repairers.
42 Different branch organisations – the association representing the mental health sector (GGZ)
and the Dutch Hospitals Association for example – are currently still negotiating two-sided GTC.
43 This code can be consulted at <www.fevad.com/uploads/files/Publications/Guide_bonnes_
pratiques_ecommerce_251011.pdf>.
44 English tenants, for example, can obtain printed forms from Law Pack Publishing and Oyez.
The OFT controls the fairness of such documents:Khatun v Newham LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 55,
para 47.
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3 Unilateral sector-specific consumer GTC drafted with the
help of public authorities
Public authorities may encourage professionals to draw up fair consumer
GTC. In the UK, the OFT recommends trade associations create model terms
for their members as ‘this is an effective way to raise standards in a large
number of contracts and in a sector as a whole’.45 The OFT sometimes works
together with trade bodies to produce those terms and provides assistance to
trade bodies who wish to draft consumer-friendly GTC.46 More generally, it
supports the self-regulatory process providing guidance and expertise to tra-
ders dealing with consumers. The OFT-guidance is based on a sample of
agreements and its experience with enforcing the legal standard and whilst it
is primarily meant for the OFT’s partners in consumer law enforcement (the
Trading Standards), it is also designed to help professionals meet the legal
requirements.
The OFT has for a certain period of time even officially approved codes of
conduct. The OFT’s Consumer Codes Approval Scheme (CCAS) aims at increasing
consumer confidence. A business that displays the CCAS logo is considered
making use of clear and fair GTC. The Carpet Foundation, the Society of Motor
Manufacturers, the British Association of Removers, the Vehicle Builders and
Repairers Association and the Direct Selling Association all have successfully
achieved approval of their codes of conduct. The success of this approval scheme,
however, remains limited and public funding has stopped.47 Meanwhile, the
Trading Standards Institute (TSI), the local enforcement authority with whom the
OFT closely cooperates (the OFT only focuses on systemic failures in a market),
has established a successor scheme to the Consumer Codes Approval Scheme on
a self-funding basis.48
45 The OFT advised the Society of Ticket Agents and Retailers to draft GTC for its members:
available at <www.star.org.uk/media/4775/tc.pdf> accessed 7 January 2014.
46 For example, the British Holiday and Home Parks Association and the National Caravan
Council approached the OFT to discuss model terms and conditions contained in the Purchase
Agreement and Licence Agreement for a Holiday Caravan Pitch.
47 BIS, ‘Empowering and Protecting Consumers: Consultation on institutional changes for provi-
sion of consumer information, advice, education, advocacy and enforcement’ (June 2011) 8
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31394/11-970-empow
ering-protecting-consumers-consultation-on-institutional-changes.pdf> accessed 7 January 2014.
48 <www.tradingstandards.gov.uk/advice/ConsumerCodes.cfm> accessed 7 January 2014. The
potential costs associated with lack of consumer confidence due to removal of the OFT consumer
code approval scheme are expected to be negligible: ibid 2. Under the UK Government’s proposals
to create a single Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the OFT will be merged into the new
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French professionals seek guidance in the recommendations of the Com-
mission des clauses abusives (CCA), a public ad hoc authority attached to
the Minister in charge of Consumer Affairs that consists of a member of the
national legal service, two legal or administrative magistrates or members
of the Council of State, two entities qualified in contract law or technique,
four professionals’ representatives and four consumers’ representatives.49 The
CCA recommendations can be looked upon as mixed public-private gui-
dance.
The French CCA is part of an administrative system of control of unfair terms
that has purely consultative duties.50 The CCA examines standard form contracts
either at a consumer or professional organisation’s request or on its own motion,
and subsequently invites professionals to review their terms on the basis of the
recommendations. The duties of the CCA are to control the GTC of contracts
normally proposed to consumers and to recommend suppression or modification
of terms that create a significant imbalance between rights and obligations of the
non-professional as opposed to those of the professional. The mainly sectoral
recommendations are guides enabling professionals to identify unfair terms.51
Recommendations are often followed and the Movement of French Enterprises
recommends businesses to do so.52
body which will have a principal focus on competition and markets. For the same, debatable,
reasons why the Commission is not empowered to endorse European codes of conduct, a continu-
ing role in consumer codes approval is not deemed appropriate for the CMA: BIS, ‘Empowering
and Protecting Consumers: Consultation on institutional changes for provision of consumer
information, advice, education, advocacy and enforcement’ (June 2011) 8 <www.gov.uk/govern
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31394/11-970-empowering-protecting-con
sumers-consultation-on-institutional-changes.pdf> accessed 7 January 2014.
49 Article R 534–1 Code de la consommation.
50 Originally the law containing the French fairness norm was meant to set up an administrative
system of control of unfair terms within which the executive would prohibit certain clauses by
decree, based on the CCA recommendations.
51 Recommendations can be consulted at <www.clauses-abusives.fr/recom/index.htm> ac-
cessed 7 January 2014.
52 GuideMEDEF Comment éviter les clauses abusives.
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4 Sector specific consumer GTC drafted via a social dialogue
mandated by a public authority
In the Netherlands, the process of self-regulation entails a dialogue between
business and consumer organisations that gives rise to bipartisan GTC. The self-
regulatory consultation coordination group of the Dutch Social and Economic
Council (SER) offers both parties an open framework for their talks on well-
balanced standard terms in accordance with the SER’s statutory task to promote
desirable trends in business and industry. The SER provides for procedural rules
and expertise but is itself not a party to the agreement.
Nearly each branch of business has its own Consultation Group on equitable
standard terms and conditions: car dealers (BOVAG), travel agents (ANVR), bank-
ers (ABV) or furniture retailers (CBW). While taking into account the specific
characteristics of the branch, the Group tries to work out the statutory provisions
on consumer GTC (the lists) and the law applicable to the branch as accurately as
possible.53
The Dutch bipartisan GTC are coupled to a complaints-handling system and
private bilateral dispute committees called Consumer Complaints Boards (there
are 41 of them).54 Dispute committees are approved by the Minister.55 The Boards
solve disputes related to the compliance with, eg the interpretation and applica-
tion of the bilateral standard terms. Rulings by the dispute committees are taken
into account while updating the GTC.
5 Ex ante co-regulation of GTC
In all three MS, co-regulation contributes to prevent the use of unfair GTC in
consumer contracts. To this end traders join forces with public actors (co-regula-
tion I) and/or with consumer associations (co-regulation II). Co-regulation of GTC
that are destined to be incorporated into B2C contracts has many faces.
First, the national public entity associated with private regulation of consu-
mer GTC differs. The OFT/TSI in the UK, the CCA in France and the Dutch SER
53 Reference can also be made to codes of conduct by which the sector has already distinguished
itself: available at <www.ser.nl/en/about_the_ser/responsibilities/general_terms.aspx> accessed
7 January 2014.
54 Almost all dispute committees operate under the banner of a separate foundation called De
Geschillencommissie.
55 In some sectors there is a legal requirement for a dispute committee to be set up (network
sectors and financial services).
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have very distinct duties. The OFT and the TSI are the administrative authorities
in charge of enforcing the legal fairness standard by testing GTC against this
standard (Article 7 UTD) whereas the CCA and the SER do not have any such
duties. The SER is the economic advisory council of the Dutch government and
the main platform for social dialogue. The CCA is a purely consultative adminis-
trative body.
Secondly, great differences concern the type of ‘assistance’ public authorities
provide to professionals who intend to draft consumer-friendly GTC. Whilst the
OFT and TSI encourage sectoral trade organisations to draft codes of conduct and
may approve of the result, the SER and the CCA facilitate a dialogue between
trade and consumer representatives. A distinctive feature of the SER is that it
coordinates negotiations between professional and consumer organisations on
GTC. The SER-platform provides for sets of bilateral consumer GTC whereas the
CCA issues guidance and advice as to which terms are considered unfair.
Third, the involvement of consumer organisations into the drafting process
varies a great deal across the MS. The drafting of bilateral GTC is a form of social
dialogue that hardly exists in in France and in the UK. Whilst consumer represen-
tatives contribute to bring forth recommendations in France, English consumer
organisations remain on the sideline. The OFT defends the interests of the con-
sumer, at the expense of consumer organisations.
6 Private reviewing of contract terms:
ex post private standards of fairness
Besides preventing the use of unfair GTC, private actors contribute to the effective
enforcement of the fairness clause. The saisine-procedure (Article R 534-4 Code de
la consommation) permits courts to ask the CCA for advice in a particular case. An
advisory opinion may be requested when, upon the occasion of proceedings, the
unfair nature of a contractual term is alleged. The competent judge may ask the
CCA, by decision not open to appeal, for its opinion on the unfair nature of this
term as defined by Article L 132-1 Code de la consommation. An advisory opinion
is not binding upon the judge who called for it.
Private standards of fairness also come forth out of the enforcement of the
legal fairness norm by private actors. Subscribing to a code of conduct generally
gives professionals access to conciliation services and/or a low-cost, legally
binding arbitration scheme. Consumer GTC often contain an ADR clause. As a
result, private actors sometimes find themselves in the position they have to
review GTC (and among other clauses, the adjudication clause conferring them
their powers) under the legal fairness norm. The availability and accessibility
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of such rulings are more limited in France56 and the UK57 than in the Nether-
lands.58
In the Netherlands, the bipartisan GTC are coupled to a complaints-handling
system and private bilateral dispute committees,59 approved by the government.60
The dispute committees tied to the bilateral GTC are sometimes held to apply the
fairness test. They apply this test to the two-sided GTC (which are generally
deemed fair) but also to supplementary clauses the professional chooses to
incorporate in a B2C contract. The Dutch Council for arbitration disputes (the
Raad van Arbitrage, which is not linked to the SER) frequently assesses the
fairness of adjudication clauses in standard construction contracts. In those
assessments it gives much significance to the fact that consumer organisations
have been involved into the wording of the terms.61 Arbitrators once called the
bipartisan character of an arbitration clause a decisive argument.62
7 Private standards and the preventive v repressive
enforcement of the fairness clause
The table below places the private (or mixed) standards within the broader picture
of the enforcement of the UTD clause. It distinguishes between the preventive and
the repressive enforcement of the fairness standard. The collective enforcement of
the clause by public agencies and the judiciary is seldom genuinely preventive (or
ex ante, in the sense that the reviewed GTC have not yet been incorporated into
56 In France, consumermediation takes place in the field of public utilities, insurances, banking,
telecommunications, health care, tourism, car sales and repair. Many sectors and major compa-
nies have mediators at their disposal that can best be compared to what is called an ‘ombudsman’
in many MS: Ch.J.S. Hodges, I. Benöhr, N. Creutzfeldt-Banda (eds), Consumer ADR in Europe
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 37.
57 OFT approved codes provide for low cost, independent dispute resolution if a complaint is not
dealt with satisfactorily.
58 Decisions by the Consumer Complaints Boards can be found at <www.degeschillencommis
sie.nl/home> accessed 7 January 2014.
59 The Boards solve disputes related to the compliance with, eg the interpretation and applica-
tion of the bilateral standard terms. Rulings by the dispute committees are being taken into
account while updating the GTC.
60 In some sectors there is a legal requirement for a dispute committee to be set up (network
sectors and financial services).
61 RvA 21 September 2011, no 32.910, para 28.
62 RvA 19 June 1997, (1998) Bouwrecht, 778.
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B2C-contracts).63 The fairness clause is generally applied after the consumer GTC
already have been incorporated in B2C-contracts. A preventive collective or
administrative procedure then aims at preventing the continued use of the term
(Article 7 UTD). A repressive procedure is generally directed at a concrete contract
term in an individual B2C-contract.
France United Kingdom The Netherlands
Preventive enforcement of the fairness clause64
Private
or mixed
standards
Recommendations of the
CCA
Publicly approved codes of
conduct
Drafting of bipartisan GTC
(social dialogue)
Main
type of
B2C-GTC
Unilateral without much
sectoral cooperation
Unilateral with sectoral
cooperation
Bilateral with sectoral
cooperation
Preventive
enforce-
ment of
the UTD
by super-
visory
authorities
Limited
The Direction Générale
de la Concurrence, de la
Consommation et de la
Répression des Fraudes
(DGCCRF) (not the CCA)
is controlling the GTC
(applying a sectoral
approach). Its
competences (which
were strictly limited to
the listed clauses) have
recently been
enlarged.65
Important
The OFT and the TSI have
both an advisory and a
controlling role. The TSI
can approve of codes of
conduct. Approved self-
regulation does however
not give a ‘safe harbour’
from potential action.66
The OFT and the Trading
Standards are very active
in enforcing the Regula-
tions and in securing
significant changes in
contract terms.
Very limited
The ACM (not the SER)
is responsible of enforcing
the UTD. It will soon
autonomously enforce
the fairness clause.67 The
ACM does not focus
on GTC in its supervisory
policy and does therefore
not actively contribute to
the preventive
enforcement of the UTD.
63 One of the few examples I know of is: SC 16 May 1997, NJ 2000, 1, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2372.
64 Case C-372/99, Commission v Italy, [2002] ECR I-819, para 15; case C-472/10, Invitel, n y r,
para 37.
65 Article L 141–1 Code de la consommation.
66 OFT, ‘Policy Statement on the role of self-regulation in the OFT’s consumer protection work’
(September 2009) s 2.8 <www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer-policy/oft1115.pdf> ac-
cessed 7 January 2014.
67 It already has the power to sanction the use of black-listed contract terms.
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France United Kingdom The Netherlands
Judicial
preventive
enforce-
ment of
the UTD
Important
Injunctive procedures
initiated by consumer
associations (not the
DGCCRF) play a
substantial part in
preventing the
(continued) use of unfair
terms.68
Limited
Injunctive procedures are
scarce (and generally
initiated by administrative
authorities).
Limited
Injunctive procedures are
scarce (and generally
initiated by consumer
associations).
Repressive enforcement of the fairness clause
Private or
mixed
standards
ADR rulings
Advisory opinions of the
CCA (avis).69
ADR rulings ADR rulings (dispute
committees)
Judicial
repressive
enforce-
ment of
the UTD
Important Important Very important
Type of
judicial
review70
The French method of
review is characterised
by (1) attention to the
term itself in the light
of the legal framework
(the lists included)
and (2) a strong focus
on assessing the
contractual balance. It is
fairly abstract in nature.
The English review gives
ample attention to the
specific circumstances of
the case: the specific
determinations of
‘substantive unfairness’
and ‘procedural unfairness’
usually representing the
two ‘cumulative’ steps
under the English test.
The Dutch review involves
a broad and very concrete
test with large attention
for the personal and
procedural circumstances
of the case. The lists
however vouch for a
fairness test that is more
abstract in nature.
In France, the emphasis lies on the judicial, both preventive and repressive,
enforcement of the clause. A co-regulatory platform involving both public and
private actors, however, serves for issuing recommendations from which traders
can draw inspiration when drafting their GTC. These recommendations are not
68 Cass Civ 1re 1 February 2005, no 03–16905, GTC that are no longer being used in new contracts
cannot be subject to a collective review. Those GTC can, in the event that they have been included
in a contract, only be subject to a repressive test.
69 Advisory opinions are available at: <www.clauses-abusives.fr/avis/index.htm> accessed
7 January 2014.
70 Pavillon, n 10 above, passim.
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binding71 and the question arises: to what extent do both the preventive and
repressive judicial enforcement of the fairness clause rely on the recommenda-
tions and advisory opinions of the CCA (IV.3)?
In the UK, trade associations and public enforcement agencies cooperate
actively in the ex ante stage. The preventive enforcement of the fairness clause
primarily boils down to the guidance and advice provided by public authorities.
The emphasis on informal processes and the fact consumer associations remain
somehow withdrawn might account for the lack of judicial preventive enforce-
ment of the fairness clause. In the Netherlands, a prolific social dialogue takes
place under the auspices of the SER (a public body that is not responsible for
enforcing the directive). The extensive informal co-regulatory process downsizes
the role of the public enforcement agencies. It indeed explains why there is less
need for the ACM to preventively screen GTC (other reasons being the lack of
human and material resources). Consumer associations, by contributing actively
to the co-regulatory process, also have less leeway to ask for a collective judicial
application of the legal standard to unfair GTC (Article 240(5) of Book 6 of the
Dutch Civil Code). In both MS, the judicial enforcement of the fairness clause
remains thus largely confined to repressive procedures. The question is whether
GTC that are based on publicly approved codes of conduct (in the UK) or biparti-
san GTC (in the Netherlands) are being put to the fairness test and if so, whether
they are given a preferential treatment (IV.4).
The next paragraphs will analyse the extent to which private (or mixed
public-private) standards (both ex ante and ex post, IV.5) flow into the judicial
interpretation of the fairness clause in the three MS. Contract law (enabling and
open-worded rules) constitutes a starting point for private (or mixed) standard-
setting. The question arises whether these standards feed back into contract law
and more specifically into the fairness clause, through court decisions.
IV Private standards of fairness
1 Judicial governance
Although many disputes involving GTC don’t reach the courts as they are resolved
through ADR or through negotiations with an administrative body, the body of
case law with regard to the fairness of GTC is still growing. This paper examines
71 Conseil d’Etat 16 January 2006, nos 274721–274722.
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the extent to which private (or mixed) standards are being taken into considera-
tion in the assessment of contract terms by civil judges. The legal standard is not
clear due to the openness of the fairness norm and the lack of guidance provided
by the CJEU. It is for the courts to decide whether the legal fairness standard is
met, how interests should be balanced and what circumstances should prevail. In
their search for benchmarks of fairness national courts may attach some signifi-
cance to private standards.
By enacting a substantive fairness analysis, the European legislator has
chosen a fairness-oriented approach and distanced himself from the freedom-
oriented approach of consumer contracts within which the content of the agree-
ment is not subject to a fairness review.72 The freedom-oriented approach departs
from the basic assumption that individual consumers are capable to defend their
own interests as long as they are duly informed about the terms of the contract.
The fairness-oriented approach does not restrict itself to examining procedural
safeguards but extends to controlling the content of contract terms. The European
fairness test is in essence a corrective mechanism for unfair market practice.
Strikingly, market practice nonetheless influences the outcome of the fairness test
in the Netherlands.
2 Market practice as a standard of fairness
(reasonable expectations)
In the Netherlands, the fact that the terms mirror business custom and usage,
meaning they are ‘ gebruikelijk’ (usual) by comparison of the type of terms used
by other traders in the sector, regularly weighs in favour of the term. The wide-
spread use of a term generally serves as a benchmark of fairness in the judicial
review of standard terms in B2B-contracts.73 When the fairness norm is applied to
a B2C dispute, the compliance with customary business practice however carries
less weight.74 Some courts nevertheless take business custom into account when
determining the reasonable expectations of the consumer; the usual nature of a
term sometimes being the only determinant.75
72 SeeWillett, n 17 above, 3–4.
73 The Dutch fairness test applies to SMB2B-contracts.
74 CFI Almelo 27 January 2009, ECLI:NL:RBALM:2009:BH1279.
75 CFI Arnhem 19 May 2004, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2004:AQ5066, para 13; CA Amsterdam 26 January
2006, NJF 2006, 269, para 4.6; CA Den Bosch 9 January 2007, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2007:AZ5893; CFI
Alkmaar 20 October 2010, ECLI:NL:RBALK:2010:BP7266, para 8. This is also the case in Poland:
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Unlike their Dutch counterparts, French and English courts never refer to
standard trade usage as a benchmark of fairness in the review of a B2C contract
term under the legal norm from European origin. According to the French
Supreme Court, the widely accepted and repeated use of a clause does on no
account operate as an evidence of fairness in B2C relationships.76 In English case
law, the usual nature of a term would in itself not suffice to fix the reasonable
expectations of a consumer.77 Equally or even more relevant is the detriment the
term may cause to the consumer and whether the consumer was duly informed
about this. Courts applying the fairness test draw in this respect inspiration from
the common law rules on incorporation. These rules provide a remedy in relation
to contract clauses that are particularly onerous and unusual and that are not
brought to the attention of the consumer. For that matter, the adjective ‘usual’ is
approached differently by Dutch and English courts. The latter will not view a
contract term as being usual simply because it forms part of profession-wide
standard terms.78 The fact that GTC have been drafted by a business sector
organisation and coupled to some kind of professional guidance (a code of
conduct for example) has not prevented them from being regarded as unusual
when applied on an once-only B2C agreement.79 Such an agreement is ‘a very
unpromising basis upon which to found an invariable, certain and general usage of
a trade’.80
According to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive honest market prac-
tice helps define the fairness of commercial practices (Article 2(h)).81 The fairness
of GTC reflecting market practice also depends on its honest and fair character.
This means additional benchmarks of fairness are required.
see F. Cafaggi, ‘Which Governance for European Private Law?’, EUI Working Paper Law No 2007/
26, 20, which refers to a decision of the Polish Competition and Consumer Protection Court
holding a clause entitling the seller to retain two installments if the consumer rescinds the
contract to be fair because it ‘(did) not deviate from the accepted trade usage’.
76 Cass Civ 1re 31 January 1995, no 93–10412, Bull civ 1995 I, no 64, 45. CA Agen 3 October 2006,
no 05/01484.
77 SeeWillett, n 17 above, 326–327.
78 Munkenbeck &Marshall vHarold [2005] EWHC 356 (TCC), para 15.
79 The High Court held some provisions in the industry standard for the terms of appointment of
architects SFA/99 to be unfair in view of the RIBA-guidance that clearly requires the members to
individually negotiate these (detrimental) provisions: Picardi v Cuniberti [2002] EWHC 2923 (TCC),
para 132–133;Munkenbeck &Marshall vHarold [2005] EWHC 356 (TCC), para 15.
80 Office of Fair TradingvAshbourneManagement Services [2011] EWHC 1237 (Ch).
81 Council Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 may 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer com-
mercial practices in the internal market (OJ 2005 L 149/22).
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3 Mixed public-private recommendations as a standard
of fairness
In France, the standards set by the mixed public-private recommendations are
something national courts hold on to when looking for additional fairness bench-
marks. The French judiciary is not bound by the standard laid down in the CCA
recommendations.82 Those documents are, however, an important source of
inspiration to courts applying the fairness test. Even though the Court of Cassa-
tion stresses their indicative value, French lower courts often rely on recommen-
dations. Their persuasive value is strong, in the sense that clauses that abide by
the recommendations of the CCA are deemed fair and clauses that deviate from it
are considered unfair (both categories being equally important, which stresses
the fact that recommendations are often complied with).83 As for the, by and
large, rarely requested advisory opinions of the CCA, courts generally follow
them.84 The French fairness test often consists of a contractual balancing that is
very much simplified by the recommendations as they show how to make up the
balance. Recommendations are mainly referred to in preventive procedures.
French consumer organisations have often seized the opportunity to enforce the
recommendations they helped drafting by using the injunctive procedure of
Article L 421–6 Code de la consommation. The predominantly abstract and preven-
tive nature of a collective procedurematches that of the recommendations. Recom-
mendations bear a ‘phantom character’ in the sense that ‘here and there it is law
applied without context’.85 Recommendations, however, also play a key role in
individual procedures. Even in more concrete repressive procedures, recommen-
dations are used as a benchmark of fairness and made ‘binding’ in the courts.86
82 Conseil d’Etat 16 January 2006, nos 274721–274722; Cass Civ 1re 13 November 1996, no 94–
17369, Bull civ 1996 I, no 399, 279; Cass Civ 2e 22 January 2009, no 07–21698.
83 Cass Civ 1re 10 February 1998, no 96–13316, Bull civ 1998 I, no 53, 34; Cass Civ 1re 20 March
2013, no K 12–14.432; Cass Civ 1re 28 May 2009, no 08–15.802 (indirect influence); CA Reims 19 May
2005; CA Paris 13 February 2009; TGI Grenoble 1 March 2010 (non-conformity); CA Grenoble
23 November 1999; CA Rennes 26 September 2002; CA Grenoble 18 May 2010 and 22 November
2010 (conformity); CA Nimes 19 March 1998; TGI Nanterre 2 June 2004 (both conformity and non-
conformity): available at <www.clauses-abusives.fr/juris/index.htm> accessed 7 January 2014.
84 See eg CA Limoges 5 April 2006; TGI Vanves 28 December 2005: available at <www.clauses-
abusives.fr/juris/index.htm>.
85 H.W. Micklitz, ‘Some reflections on Cassis de Dijon and the Control of Unfair Contract Terms in
Consumer Contracts’, in H. Collins (ed), Standard Contract Terms in Europe: A Basis for and a
Challenge to European Contract Law (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2008) 30.
86 CA Paris 2 May 1995; CA Versailles 21 November 2003 (conformity); CA Rennes 4 July
2003; Juridiction de proximité de Nantes 30 November 2007; TI Charleville Mézières 11 October 10
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Like the UTD list, which kept its indicative nature after transposition, the recom-
mendations have compensated for the lack of legislative lists of unfair terms. Now
that such lists exist, their importance might decrease. The recommendations have
also made up for the absence of two-sided terms as they are geared to the specific
characteristics of different branches of business.
4 Two-sided or publicly approved GTC as a standard of fairness
Dutch consumer groups who have agreed with the professionals’ general terms
and conditions are not allowed to bring an action against him (Article 240(5) of
Book 6 of the Civil Code). The model contract produced by the consultation group
may still be challenged for legal invalidity by administrative authorities and by
individual consumers. The Netherlands ACM (which will soon autonomously
enforce the fairness clause), however, only targets one-sided GTC, leaving biparti-
san GTC unstirred. The judiciary exerts only repressive control over two-sided
GTC. And even this control is restrained since the private dispute resolution
system absorbs many complaints.
The ‘coming into being of the GTC’ is one of the circumstances Dutch courts
have to take into account when testing a term against Article 233(a) of Book 6 of
the Civil Code. The Dutch Supreme Court recently stressed the ‘great importance’
attached to the dialogue between professionals and consumer representatives by
the provisions on GTC of the Dutch Civil Code. While assessing the fairness of a
procuration clause in a bank’s GTC, it underlined the similarity between the
clause under review and the procuration clause in the two-sided general banking
terms (to which the bank in question had not subscribed).87 The fact that the
wording of the clause was identical to the wording of a clause that had been
approved by the Consumentenbond carried weight.
The involvement of the general Dutch Consumers’ Association in establishing
the GTC used in a particular sector is – when courts refer to it – a major argument
in favour of the fairness of a standard term,88 although it is generally not the sole
(non-conformity), available at <www.clauses-abusives.fr/juris/index.htm> accessed 7 January
2014.
87 SC 3 February 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BT6947, para 4.4.5.
88 CFI Maastricht 1 November 1995, Prg 1996, 4602; CA Den Bosch 16 July 2002, NJ 2003, 445; CFI
Assen 4 July 2008, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2008:BD6324; CFI Alkmaar 5 November 2008, ECLI:NL:
RBALK:2008:BG5040; CFI The Hague 5 August 2009, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BJ5496; CFI Arnhem
30 December 2009, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2009:BL0530; CFI Arnhem 14 June 2010, ECLI:NL:
RBARN:2010:BN4320.
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argument.89 In the case law study underlying this paper, (nearly) all judicially
reviewed contract terms whose two-sidedness was explicitly referred to, have been
declared fair.90 In the above case, there is, however, something different going
on. The two-sided banking GTC are not being put to the test. The judicial review
pertains to a one-sided clause and it is the (approximate) similarity between the
one-sided term and the two-sided private standard that is considered an evidence
of fairness.91 The Dutch Supreme Court uses the two-sided general banking terms
as a benchmark of fairness.
When two-sided GTC are being put to the test, the law and, more specifically,
the grey list serve as the primary fairness benchmark for the Dutch judiciary (II.3).
Even the ‘fair’ cancellation clauses whose two-sidedness was specifically ac-
knowledged were initially presumed to be unfair,92 the explicit referral to their
two-sidedness being one of the factors that rebutted this (legal) presumption.
When the two-sidedness of a contract term is noticed, it generally passes the test
or even acts as a benchmark of fairness.93 The deviation from a two-sided term (to
the detriment of the consumer) has, however, not yet explicitly been noticed in a
civil procedure94 and is not considered an evidence of unfairness.95
In the UK, the publicly approved codes of conduct have as far as can be
deducted from case law reports, not played any role in the judicial fairness
assessment since terms reflecting or breaching those codes have not (yet) been
89 CADen Bosch 9 August 2011, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2011:BR6638 being an exception.
90 Except for two arbitration clauses: CFI Amsterdam 24 March 2010, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2010:
BM5984 and CAAmsterdam 17 April 2012, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BX3835.
91 C.M.D.S. Pavillon, ‘De bindende kracht van tweezijdige algemene voorwaarden’ (2013) Neder-
lands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 43, 371.
92 According to Article 237(i) of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code, a stipulation that forces the
counterparty, in the event that the agreement is ended for another reason than a failure of the
counterparty in the performance of his obligation, to pay a sum ofmoney, is unfair except as far as
it concerns a reasonable compensation for the loss or missed profits of the user.
93 In many cases involving two-sided GTC, courts nonetheless ‘omit’ to explicitly notice their
two-sided nature. In those cases, bipartisan contract terms seem to have equal chances of either
passing or failing the fairness test. This means that, all examined cases involving bilateral GTC
put together, two-sided terms aremore apt to be held fair than unilateral ones.
94 It has however been noticed in administrative procedures based on Article 6(2)(b) of the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive: CFI Rotterdam 19 January 2010, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK9796 &
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2010:BK9798 and CFI Rotterdam 14 April 2011, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2011:BQ1281 two
kitchen selling companies – both members of the Living Central Trade Association (CBW) – were
sentenced for infringing on the CBW’s bilateral GTC: C.M.D.S. Pavillon, ‘The Interplay between
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and Codes of Conduct’ (2012) Erasmus Law Review 4,
281–282.
95 Pavillon, n 91 above, 372.
Private Standards of Fairness in European Contract Law 109
Brought to you by | Universiteit Leiden / LUMC
Authenticated | c.m.d.s.pavillon@law.leidenuniv.nl author's copy
Download Date | 5/12/14 12:28 PM
subject to a judicial fairness test. The effective private enforcement may explain
why disputes are not brought before courts and potential plaintiffs may abstain
from litigating clauses that have been ex ante approved. The fact that public
enforcement authorities have been directly involved into the drafting process
may vouch for in abstracto fair GTC. The situation in the UK differs fundamentally
from the situation in the Netherlands where enforcement authorities do not
screen nor approve of the GTC before they are applied to B2C-contracts.
5 Private adjudication (ex post standards) flowing into the
judicial interpretation of the legal fairness norm
Private mediators, adjudicators or arbitrators may apply the legal fairness test to
GTC. The dispute committees of the SER review the fairness of two- and one-sided
GTC and arbitrators (eg the Dutch Council for arbitration disputes) are often held
to review the fairness of a jurisdiction clause.96 The question is whether national
courts refer to this ‘private’ jurisprudence when applying the fairness test.97 Do
decisions of private boards, when they are published (which is not always the
case), work as a precedent or a guideline? Private rulings by Dutch mediators
and arbitrators are widely accessible. Dutch courts however do not attach much
value to their interpretation and application of the fairness test.98 This doesn’t
alter the fact that in the Netherlands, decisions by dispute committees guide the
legal settlement of disputes involving GTC with help of other open norms such as
the standard of reasonableness and fairness (thereby gaining legally binding
force).99 As I have not been able to trace any private rulings regarding the validity
and applicability of contract terms in France and the UK, it comes as no surprise
French and English courts never refer to such rulings in their fairness assess-
ment.
96 As shows the ‘case law’ of the the Dutch Court of Arbitration for the Building Industry.
97 The outcome of alternative dispute resolution can sometimes be challenged before a judicial
court. The judicial control on the private review however falls outside the ambit of this paper.
98 In CFI Maastricht 14 October 2009, ECLI:NL:RBMAA:2009:BK1266, the user of GTC unsuccess-
fully invoked the ‘case law’ of the dispute committee on telecommunications as an argument.
99 HR 12 January 1996, NJ 1996, 683. See I. Giesen, Alternatieve regelgeving en privaatrecht
(Deventer: Kluwer, 2007) 99.
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V The rationale behind the judicial endorsement
of private standards
1 Distilling some criteria
The open norm of the UTD was designed to put contract terms to a broad fairness
test in order to compensate for the imbalance that exists between the consumer
and the seller or supplier. Courts generally have recourse to legal benchmarks to
address and redress the imbalance (II.3). Private regulation influences the out-
come of the fairness test in judicial procedures, especially in France and in the
Netherlands. By taking this regulation into account while assessing the fairness
of a contract term on the basis of a legal norm, civil courts confer legitimacy on it.
This paragraph discusses the reasons why national courts chose to (partly) found
the enforceability of a contract term on a standard that was (partly) set by private
actors (besides the fact that courts are in need of guidance and additional fairness
indicators). The fairness clause however sets a demanding objective standard as
shows the reference to the good faith concept. This raises the question whether
private regulation can be deemed fair or even be used as a benchmark of fairness.
2 A standard
To start with, only a standard can operate as a benchmark. A standard is some-
thing established by authority, custom, or general consent as a model or an
example. Alignment with (market) custom presupposes that:
– the contract term is acknowledged, commonly used and widely accepted: to
find out whether a contract term is usual or not, a court will for example
compare different standard form contracts (both one- and two-sided).100
– the standard term is based on economic records that are common for the
sector. Dutch courts sometimes examine the economic considerations on
which the standard term is founded. To this end they rely on information
provided by the sectoral trade organisation.101
100 CADen Bosch 9 January 2007, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2007:AZ5893.
101 CFI Alkmaar 20 October 2010, ECLI:NL:RBALK:2010:BP7266, para 8; CFI Alkmaar 19 October
2005, ECLI:NL:RBALK:2005:AV1131, para 8. Courts lack information about the idiosyncratic con-
ditions under which particular markets operate and are keen on holding on to the information
traders provide them.
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In relation to custom, it is the repeated and widespread use of the contract term
combined with opinio juris (especially when the term is two-sided as it shows a
high degree of consensus) that makes the term binding and recognised by judges
as a legal source.102 In Dutch case law, the customary nature of a contract term
sometimes fixes the reasonable expectations of a consumer within the context of
the fairness test (IV.2). In a few cases involving a dispute between a professional
and a consumer, courts decided the consumer should reasonably expect a con-
tract term that is in line with market norms. Their great significance in B2B dis-
putes explains why those norms affect the fairness of consumer GTC.
Since the European fairness norm protects the consumer agreeing to terms
drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier, one would however not expect the
habitual nature of those terms to determine the outcome of the fairness test. By
only basing the fairness of a contract term on its conformity with market norms,
courts place the interests of the professional at its centre without balancing them
against the consumer interests. As far as the consumer interests are not properly
taken into account, this interpretation of the fairness-norm would be contrary to
the purpose of the UTD, which is to prevent abusive exercise of private regulatory
power and protecting the consumer as a weaker party. English courts have ack-
nowledged that, since the good faith concept ‘ looks to good standards of commer-
cial morality and practice’, it is not the conventional nature of a practice, but its
honest and reasonable character that matters.103
Only fair standards can operate as standards of fairness. The main reason
why private standards are deemed fair (two-sided GTC) or used as a benchmark of
fairness (two-sided GTC and recommendations) is their co-regulatory nature:
courts assume that cooperation with public entities (V.3) or cooperative negotia-
tions between representatives of the parties in the market (V.4) warrant fairness.
3 A fair standard: public endorsement (co-regulation I)
In the interpretation of the fairness norm by French courts, the recommendations
of the CCA have made up for the lack of legislative lists and the absence of
bilateral GTC. Recommendations would, however, not have had the same impact
on the fairness norm had they not officially emanated from a public organ. The
administrative framework within which private actors cooperate and the legal
102 F. Cafaggi, ‘Private Regulation in European Private Law’, in A.S. Hartkamp et al (eds),
Towards a European Civil Code (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer, 2011) 108.
103 DGFT v First National Bank [2001] 1 UKHL 52, para 17.
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embedding of the recommendations explain their acceptance as a benchmark of
fairness. In the same way, the SER setting the framework for the negotiations on
bipartisan GTC increases their legitimacy.104 Standardisation being mandated by
a public authority can be held legitimate and fair. The public involvement spurs
professionals to set higher standards than the legal standard, over and above the
statutory minimum. Courts do not need to evaluate the legal content of the private
regulation as respect for the legal requirements can be expected.
The involvement of a public authority does not, however, necessarily mean
the minimum legal requirements are met. As bilateral GTC are largely inspired by
default rules and the lists, one might expect that courts would always deem two-
sided GTC fair. The open-textured legal provisions, however, permit diverging
interpretations and Dutch courts do not necessarily have to acquiesce in the
drafting parties’ interpretation of the law. Even if the requirement is clear (black
list), the public input in the industry-led standard-setting does not automatically
bring the private standard in line with the legal standard. The involvement of the
Dutch SER in the bilateral negotiations on consumer GTC does not vouch for the
private standards being up to the legislative standard. Even though the law forms
the point of departure for the negotiations, the final terms agreed upon sometimes
diverge from the legal standard.105 Such terms do not a priori fulfil the require-
ment of substantive fairness.
Unlike the English TSI (and previously the OFT), the SER does not ex ante
endorse the GTC it helps to draft. In the absence of a sound approval mechanism,
courts should always control the bipartisan GTC’s conformity with the law before
concluding to their fairness. More importantly, the ACM should in my opinion
screen the substantive fairness of bipartisan GTC, something it does not do.
According to the Dutch enforcement authority, two-sided GTC guarantee basic
consumer rights.106 This is, however, not always the case and should therefore be
checked. The ACM could even endorse balanced GTC that meet the legal require-
ments. However, the further development of public endorsement schemes is
highly improbable since the ACM is quite reticent towards the ex ante approval of
private regulation (in view of its enforcement duties).
104 Whether the approval of a set of terms or a code of conduct by the OFT makes a difference is
not clear. I am not aware of any cases involving GTC that have resulted from negotiations with the
OFT.
105 Pavillon, n 91 above, 369–370.
106 See for example <www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/7219/In-meubel–en-keuken
branche-consument-vaak-onvoldoende-beschermd/> accessed 7 January 2014.
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4 A fair standard: collective negotiations (co-regulation II)
The Dutch Civil Code deems the ‘coming into being of the GTC’ relevant to the
fairness review (Article 233(a) of Book 6 of the Civil Code).107 Although the two-
sidedness of GTC is not systematically taken into consideration by lower courts,
an analysis of Dutch case law shows that when a term’s two-sidedness is
accounted for, the term (nearly) always passes the fairness test. Judging by the
fact that Dutch bipartisan terms generally escape administrative scrutiny with
regard to their fairness, respect for two-sidedness is even higher with the public
enforcement authority (ACM).
The question then arises why two-sided terms are, overall, less likely to be
viewed as unfair. Although courts that choose to put emphasis on the two-
sidedness of GTC do not elaborate on this choice, they allegedly presume biparti-
san terms to be ‘less suspect’ than unilateral terms. This presumption is evidently
based on the fact that the Dutch Consumers’ Association has participated, as an
equal partner, in the negotiations on GTC and consented to its outcome. Courts
may hereby assume that the consumers’ interests were appropriately represented
and secured during the process by the main consumer association in the Nether-
lands (with more than half a million members). The procedural guarantees
provided for by the SER as well as the long tradition and past successes of this
mutual dialogue may reinforce the assumption that two-sided GTC meet proce-
dural and substantive fairness requirements such as the consumer’s ability to
(indirectly) influence the substance of the terms and the obligation for the trader
to take the consumer’s legitimate interests into account.
Courts should explicitly acknowledge the internal governance structure and
accountability of private organisations prior to deeming their standards fair and
even more so before using them as a benchmark of fairness.108 The two-sidedness
of standard terms and the democratic legitimacy of the consumer and trade
organisations partaking in the negotiations should, however, not deprive the
consumer from the legal protection he is entitled to receive. First, an in abstracto
fair term may be unfair in view of the concrete circumstances surrounding the
case (Article 4(1) UTD). The collective interests defended by a consumer associa-
tion may differ from the interests of an individual consumer. Second, the presence
of a consumer organisation at the negotiation table does not automatically vouch
for in abstracto fair GTC (V.3). A negotiated standard term should be tackled if the
107 The Dutch Civil Code also stimulates bipartisan GTC by making the right to bring an action
against a trader dependent on the acceptance to negotiate the adjustment of the terms (Articles
240(4) of Book 6).
108 Cf F. Cafaggi, ‘Self-regulation in European Contract Law’, in Collins (ed), n 85 above, 137.
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consumers’ interests were not adequately secured by their representatives at the
time it was drafted. Sometimes trade off occurs and a detrimental term might be
agreed upon in exchange for a more favourable term elsewhere in the contract or
the setting up and continuation of an independent dispute committee.109 And
after a while, the result of the negotiations might have lost touch with recent legal
developments (V.3).110
Courts should therefore always assess the substantive fairness of private
regulation that has not publicly been screened or approved. This assessment is an
abstract one if the regulation is subject to a preventive procedure or meant to be
used as a standard of fairness. In an individual (repressive) procedure, an abstract
assessment would also suffice as long as it benefits the consumer. If not, a court
must take into account all the circumstances of the case at the time of conclusion
of the contract (II.1). If the private standard has been publicly endorsed it should
benefit from a presumption of fairness that may be refuted in an individual
(repressive) procedure. Likewise, a term deviating from an endorsed private
standard should be presumed unfair.111
VI Conclusion: private standards of fairness with a
view to harmonisation
Private policing of consumer GTC barely exists at the European level and does not
contribute to the harmonised interpretation and application of the legislative
fairness test. Sectoral models of European GTC are available,112 but need to be
adapted to national legal systems as the applicable standards differ a lot. At the
109 M.B.M. Loos,Algemene voorwaarden (TheHague:BoomJuridischeuitgevers, (2013) para 217.
110 CFI Amsterdam 24 March 2010, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2010:BM5984 and CA Amsterdam 17 April
2012, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BX3835: arbitration clauses in the NL are being heavily criticised for
compromising access to justice and courts deeming them unfair point out at point (q) of the UTD-
list. Another example is Article 17 of the 1996 GTC of the Netherlands association of contracting
installing companies and technical retailers (UNETO-VNI), which breaches the Consumer Sales
Directive.
111 Pavillon, n 91 above, 371–373.
112 See for a few examples the summary of the proceedings of the Workshop on Contract Law
and Standard Terms and Conditions, Brussels, 19 January 2004: available at <ec.europa.eu/
justice/newsroom/contract/events/040119_en.htm>. On the European level, the national laws of
contract and the lack of a common frame of reference have been a major impediment to the
creation of European sets of standard terms: A.G. Castermans, ‘Towards a European Contract Law
through Social Dialogue’ (2011) European Review of Contract Law 2, 366–367. The Draft Common
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European level there are, however, no consumer GTC, let alone two-sided terms
or an alternative dispute resolution mechanism on GTC.113 Neither is there a
European CCA that issues recommendations or advice.114 There are, for the time
being, no private standards at the European level that courts applying the fairness
norm could refer to. It does not look like the situation will evolve soon. In the
meanwhile, national courts in search for private benchmarks can only revert to
private standards from national origin.
The search for private benchmarks adds to the low degree of predictability
about judicial decisions regarding the fairness of GTC. Among the national courts
applying the fairness test under scrutiny, Dutch courts put the highest value on
trade custom and usage. Business customs resemble default rules in the sense
that they are nationally or even locally determined. It therefore seems unlikely
that referring to them would generate a harmonised interpretation of the fairness
norm throughout the EU.115 Moreover, by bringing trade customs into prominence,
courts disregard the normative standard set by the UTD.116
The availability of private regulation and the importance courts attach to the
available private standards when assessing the fairness of a term vary from MS to
MS. Among the reviewed countries, the Netherlands also are the only country
where bilateral negotiations on GTC take place on a large scale.117 Consumer
associations are actively involved into the drafting of the terms, thereby affecting
the judicial appreciation of GTC. Harmonisation is here again at stake since a
consideration such as the two-sidedness of GTC is irrelevant in other MS. What
significance should be attached to the fact that a consumer body was involved
into the drafting of the GTC? How does this involvement relate to Article 2(3) UTD
that actually points at the inability of individual consumers to influence the
substance of the term? Should the bilateral enactment of the GTC induce a
different interpretation of the fairness norm (affecting either the good faith or the
Frame of Reference and the proposed Regulation on an Optional Common European Sales Law
might in the future enable professionals to draw up contracts that can be used throughout the EU.
113 Recently there has been a plea for a social dialogue on the European level under the auspices
of the European Commission. European Consultation Groups after the Dutch model could draft
sector-specific documents that can be used anywhere and identify in advance the choices the
trader needs tomake at the national level: see Castermans, n 112 above.
114 The Committee on unfair terms in consumer contracts Article 40 of the Proposal for a
Directive on consumer rights provided for could perhaps have fulfilled a similar role at the
European level.
115 H. Collins, ‘EC Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices’, in Collins (ed), n 1 above, 795.
116 The question arises whether courts should hold on to custom and usage as the fairness
clause was designed as a regulatory control onmarket practices.
117 There aremany examples of bilateral GTC in Germany as well.
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imbalance criterion) in an individual setting? For the sake of (minimum) harmoni-
sation and consumer protection, the further development of criteria to determine
whether a private (or mixed) standard amounts to a standard of fairness is much
to be welcomed.
Note: This study was completed on 1st January 2014.
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